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POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN AIRLINES–U.S.
AIRWAYS MERGER AND ANTITRUST
SETTLEMENT
Michelle Chan*
ABSTRACT
American Airlines was one of the airline industry’s darlings. A
legacy airline, it was a household name, a massive entity, employed
thousands, and commanded a fearsome presence among other
industry players like unions and airport terminals. However, with
ballooning costs and the red ocean airline industry’s evolution,
American Airlines’ parent company, AMR, was forced into
bankruptcy in November 2011. To emerge from Chapter 11,
American Airlines and U.S. Airways announced plans to merge and
come out a stronger, larger airline in February 2013.
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division shortly thereafter filed
a lawsuit opposing the merger, alleging it would have
anticompetitive effects by decreasing the number of industry
competitors and increasing prices. However, the lawsuit, despite
having substantial reasons to move forward to trial, settled in
November 2013. This Note will discuss the potential motivations
behind this settlement, ultimately arguing that political
considerations, which normally do not play a role in antitrust
enforcement, were the driving factor.
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INTRODUCTION
The AMR bankruptcy, merger, and antitrust suit depict the story of
a legacy airline seeking rescue from financial disaster by agreeing to
merge with U.S. Airways, only to be surprised by the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division’s lawsuit. In November 2011, the parent
company of American Airlines, AMR, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.1
AMR was one of the last of the legacy U.S. airline carriers to file for
bankruptcy.2 Legacy airlines include those that were founded earlier and
traditionally known to provide better service (like free baggage and inflight catering).3 AMR suffered overwhelming cumulative losses of $10
billion since 2001,4 annual union costs of $600 million more than those
of its rivals, 5 and fierce competition from consolidated legacy-airline
sharks that swam in its increasingly red ocean6.
Miraculously, in February 2013, AMR found a haven from the
uncertainty of Chapter 11 through the opportunity to merge with U.S.
Airways, a slightly smaller provider of domestic flights.7 Doug Parker,
U.S. Airways’ CEO, stated that the opportunity for a merger developed
two years earlier, when AMR filed for bankruptcy.8 He said it was a
1. Dominic Rushe, American Airlines Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Protection, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2011/nov/29/american-airlines-chapter-11-bankruptcy.
2. Id.
3. C.S., Legacy vs Low-Cost Carriers: Spot the Difference, THE ECONOMIST,
March 26, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/03/legacy-vs-lowcost-carriers.
4. See Frank Voisin, Staggering chart shows the decade of losses at American
Airlines (AMR, AER), SMARTER INVESTING BY COVESTOR (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://investing.covestor.com/2011/08/staggering-chart-shows-the-decade-of-losses-atamerican-airlines-amr-aer.
5. Rushe, supra note 1.
6. Susan Carey, Brent Kendall & Jack Nicas, U.S. Moves to Block US Airways–
American Airlines Merger, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424127887324769704579010612415800106.html [hereinafter U.S.
Moves to Block Merger].
7. Susan Carey, U.S. Leaves American–US Airways Deal in a Lurch, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 18, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873234238045790207
62369438156.html [hereinafter U.S. Leaves Deal in a Lurch].
8. Susan Carey, US Airways Chief Describes Biggest Challenges in AMR
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304579404579232100811998912#printMode [hereinafter Biggest
Challenges].
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logical partnership that would allow the new entity to be a contender
against large legacy airlines, as opposed to the low-cost carriers.9 He did
not see the bankruptcy as a large problem but rather as an advantage that
would allow AMR to address its inflated operating expenses. 10 The
opportunity allowed the companies to take advantage of each other’s
best assets, and promised an additional $280 million each year in
revenue.11
The companies gave themselves until mid-December 2013 to
finalize the proposed deal.12 They agreed to keep the American Airlines
company name and the U.S. Airways CEO in office;13 it seemed as if
everyone, including the employees’ and pilots’ unions, were pleased.14
In August 2013, however, the parties were shocked to discover that
their merger was the target of a Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust
Division lawsuit.15 The suit threatened to disrupt AMR’s intentions to
complete its bankruptcy proceedings quickly.16 A prompt resolution of
the bankruptcy issue was an essential cornerstone for the merger, and
therefore, American Airlines and U.S. Airlines were relying upon the
government’s blessing to move forward.17
The Antitrust Division’s intervention came about quite
unexpectedly given the division’s history of offering rapid approval of a
number of similar mergers. 18 In recent years, the airline industry had
become a red ocean because the level of competition made it difficult
for legacy carriers to turn a profit.19 They were left with two options:
merge with one another or reorganize in Chapter 11.20

9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Steven Pearlstein, Why the Justice Department Blocked the American–US
Airways Merger, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/15/why-the-justicedepartment-blocked-the-american-us-airways-merger/.
12. U.S. Leaves Deal in a Lurch, supra note 7.
13. Id.
14. U.S. Moves to Block Merger, supra note 6.
15. Biggest Challenges, supra note 8.
16. U.S. Moves to Block Merger, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. Pearlstein, supra note 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The surprise move by the Antitrust Division culminated in a
settlement in November 2013. 21 While the Antitrust Division has a
reputation for not considering political factors when deciding whether to
block corporate mergers,22 the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger
was different. In fact, politics seems to have played a significant role in
its decision to settle the suit.
This note will discuss Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the general
independence of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and
Federal Trade Commission as antitrust law enforcement agencies.
Section II of this note will discuss why the Antitrust Division should
have prosecuted the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger on its
antitrust merits, as well as the stand-alone theory and advantage pricing
theory, both of which were strong incentives for pursuing the case at
trial. Section III of this note will discuss three reasons why the Antitrust
Division may have opted to settle this lawsuit, and will ultimately
determine that a long-term settlement strategy and litigation risk fears
were unlikely to be strong enough, but that political forces may have
been the driver behind the lawsuit’s settlement.
I. GENERAL APPLICATIONS OF § 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST
DIVISION AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S COMPLAINT WAS BASED UPON A VIOLATION
OF § 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act bans commercial activity when a
company acquires another one, which causes a substantial decrease in
competition or creates a monopoly.23 The antitrust merger doctrine aims
21. Jad Mouawad, Merger of American and US Airways is Waved Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/business/airlines-clearfinal-merger-obstacle.html?ref=business&pagewanted=print.
22. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1055, 1112 (2010) (citing Malcolm B. Coate & Shaw W. Ulrick,
Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review
Process 1996-2003, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 531, 564 (2005)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person
engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
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to protect competition in a particular market or line of commerce.24 The
Antitrust Division argued that an American Airlines–U.S. Airways
merger would threaten competition in the domestic airline industry by
leaving only four remaining major domestic airlines and exposing
consumers to rising ticket prices.25 Therefore, if the Antitrust Division’s
suit had been successful, it would have found a violation of Clayton Act
Section 7.26
B. IN THE PAST, THE GOVERNMENT’S ANTITRUST ENFORCERS HAD A
REPUTATION FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE.
While the DOJ is not traditionally considered an independent
agency like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”),27 its enforcement
of antitrust laws through the Antitrust Division to guard the institutions
of capitalism and freedom of opportunity28 is generally non-partisan.29
Congress did not intend the antitrust statutes to give courts jurisdiction
over social issues and theories, such as the efficiency of the economy or
small business initiatives, but rather it intended to protect consumers and
their right to fair treatment.30
Since their formation, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission have established guidelines to analyze horizontal

commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.”).
24. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
25. Complaint at 3, United States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01236
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013).
26. Id. at 7.
27. Sheila F. Anthony, Remarks at the Columbia University International
Journalists Seminar (March 21, 2000), (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/
public-statements/2000/03/remarks); see Marisa Taylor & Margaret Talev, Politics
Weakens Justice Dept. Independence, MCCLATCHY DC (June. 18, 2007),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2007/06/18/17061/politics-weakens-justice-dept.html
(showing evidence of the partisan nature of the Department of Justice).
28. Antitrust Division Mission, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html.
29. Bill Baer, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the New York State Bar
Association (Jan. 30, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/303269.pdf).
30. Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1174
(1984).
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mergers. 31 The guidelines describe what aspects of deals enforcement
agencies should focus on to determine if the agency that opts to
prosecute has grounds under antitrust law to do so. 32 Of the aspects
covered, the guidelines cover relevant market definition, measurement
and concentration of the market, potential adverse competitive effects of
the proposed merger, entry factors, efficiencies, and failing-company
considerations. 33 Notably missing from the list of considerations are
political factors.34
The government has lived up to its apolitical calling, as an FTC
study from 2006 examining the Bush Senior and Clinton
administrations’ antitrust records found no differences in the standards
antitrust officials used to enforce cases.35 This result emerged regardless
of the officials’ political affiliation or of the party in control of the
White House.36 This study by Malcolm Coate, a senior economist at the
FTC’s Bureau of Economics,37 found that the “FTC merger policy has
remained constant across both Republican and Democratic
administrations over the past twenty years.”38
This study was included in an article by Coate and Shawn W.
Ulrick that was published in the Antitrust Law Journal. 39 The article
discussed transparency in the FTC enforcement of horizontal merger
doctrine. 40 The study provided econometric analysis to pinpoint
variables—such as market concentration, entry conditions, and viable
customer concerns—which affected the differing enforcement of

31. C. PAUL ROGERS III, STEPHEN CALKINS, MARK R. PATTERSON & WILLIAM R.
ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 558 (4th ed. 2008).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 558-559.
34. See id.
35. Sokol, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. Malcolm B. Coate – Antitrust Writing Awards 2014, INSTITUTE OF
COMPETITION LAW ANTITRUST WRITING AWARDS & RANKING 2014,
awards.concurrences.com/auteur/malcolm-b-coate.
38. Sokol, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
39. Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, Transparency at the Federal Trade
Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review Process, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 531, 531
(2006).
40. Id. at 531-32.

182

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

mergers.41 The study found that the identity of the controlling party in
the executive branch did not influence enforcement policy.42
The study began by looking at the entirety of Hart-Scott-Rodino
second requests sent by the FTC between 1996 and 2003.43 Hart-ScottRodino is a set of amendments to federal antitrust laws, primarily the
Clayton Antitrust Act,44 which requires parties to file information and
receive approval from the FTC or Antitrust Division before they can
complete mergers. 45 This ensures the merger gets the approval and
supervision of the government. 46 A so-called “second request” occurs
when the Antitrust Division or FTC believes there may be an
anticompetitive concern and needs more information from the parties
merging. 47 The study conducted single-market competitive effects
analysis and attempted to define the market.48 In its analysis, it included
factors such as concentration, ease of entry, and specific evidence
showing anti-competitive concerns.49 Of the 151 horizontal transactions,
half involved a sole market where competition might be harmed,50 while
thirty-five transactions involved at least five markets for analysis.51
The econometric models the study utilized involve binary outcomes
to determine the relationship between enforcement and the variables that
might be behind the enforcement.52 The first model discussed is the core
model, which analyzed a 570-observation sample and was the widest
data set available.53 It considered the enforcement decision based upon
structural variables including the HHI, 54 the change in the HHI, the
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 533 (excluding those that did not involve horizontal mergers of enough
substance or those that did not warrant a full investigation).
44. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART-SCOTT-RODINO PREMERGER NOTIFICATION
PROGRAM: INTRODUCTORY GUIDE III 1 (June 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/guide3.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Coate & Ulrick, supra note 39, at 533.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 535.
53. Id. at 536.
54. The HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a measurement of market
concentration calculated by squaring the market share, expressed in percentage points,
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number of significant rivals, and industry control variables like those in
oil, grocery, and chemical industries.55 The remaining models looked at
were the broad model and the final model.56 The broad model looked
specifically at those mergers that involved one to three markets.
However, this model may not provide meaningful results since it was
impossible to use it to look at how large mergers affect competition in
many other relevant markets due to the lack of raw data.57 Ultimately,
the final model was the most useful in analyzing mergers that raised
only one or two competitive concerns.58
The relationships of the variables remained stable throughout the
study, leading Coate and Ulrick to conclude that the political party in
control of the executive branch was not influential in the outcome of a
merger investigation.59
An example of the Antitrust Division’s apolitical approach to
enforcement60 can be found in the 2011 lawsuit to block the proposed
merger of AT&T and T-Mobile. 61 Andrew Hogley, an Espirito Santo
Telecoms analyst, opined that the case gained momentum because many
state governors and attorney generals were vocally supporting the case
on behalf of the merging companies.62 He hypothesized that the strength
and pressure of AT&T’s lobbying was gaining traction with the
Antitrust Division. 63 But the Antitrust Division weathered the intense
lobbying efforts from the merging companies, ultimately deciding that

of all competing firms in the market and summing these results. Herfindahl-Hirshman
Index, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hhi.html.
55. Coate & Ulrick, supra note 39, at 536.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 532.
60. See Instant View: U.S. Gov’t to Block AT&T Bid for T-Mobile, 19 No. 6
Westlaw Journal Antitrust 2, Sept. 8, 2011, 2011 WL 3962737 (WJANTI) [hereinafter
Gov’t Blocks AT&T Bid for T-Mobile] (according to Andrew Schwartzman, Media
Access Project senior vice president and policy director); Justice Department Files
Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/
2011/274615.htm.
61. Gov’t Blocks AT&T Bid for T-Mobile, supra note 60, at 2.
62. Id. at 1.
63. Id.
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the merger should not go forward because it would be contrary to the
interests of consumers.64
C. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION IS OFTEN ONLY WILLING TO SETTLE AN
ANTITRUST LAWSUIT WHEN IT THINKS THE SETTLEMENT ADDRESSES ITS
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONCERNS.
In its complaint, the Antitrust Division stated that a merger would
create a decreasingly competitive market for legacy airlines because of
the price gap between legacy airlines and cheaper alternatives. 65 “In
many relevant markets, these [non-legacy] airlines do not offer any
service at all, and in other markets, many passengers view them as a less
preferred alternative to the legacy carriers. Therefore, competition from
Southwest, JetBlue, or other airlines would not be sufficient to prevent
the anticompetitive consequences of the merger.”66
The complaint stated that unless the merger was enjoined “(a)
actual and potential competition between U.S. Airways and American
Airlines would be eliminated; (b) competition in general among network
airlines would be lessened substantially; (c) ticket prices and ancillary
fees would be higher than they otherwise would; (d) industry capacity
would be lower than it otherwise would; (e) service would be lessened;
and (f) the availability of slots at Reagan National would be
significantly impaired.” 67 The nature of this language suggested
enjoinment was the only option unless the Department’s anticompetitive
concerns were addressed.68
II. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
PROSECUTED ON THE MERITS BECAUSE OF TWO MAJOR CONCERNS: THE
STAND-ALONE THEORY AND THE ADVANTAGE-PRICING THEORY.
A. THE STAND-ALONE THEORY
The stand-alone theory was premised upon the idea that American
Airlines would be better off post-bankruptcy without the merger because
64. Id. at 2 (according to Andrew Schwartzman, Media Access Project senior vice
president and policy director).
65. Complaint, supra note 25, at 33.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 33-34.
68. See id.
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of its extensive expansion plan, which a merger would disrupt.69 In fact,
the Antitrust Division in its initial complaint stated that “[a] US
Airways’ executive vice president . . . wrote in July 2012 that ‘[t]here is
NO question about AMR’s ability to survive on a standalone basis.’”70
Even the media was aware of the options available to American
Airlines should the merger not survive.71 For example, an opt-out course
from the merger agreement for American Airlines seemed highly
appealing.72 The potential reasons for a stand-alone result were varied:
(1) American’s managers initially feared that the merger would cost
them their jobs; (2) American’s management would, and could, keep
working even without the merger; and (3) American was prospering in
bankruptcy, enjoying its best second quarter in history.73
With this option at the edge of the table, the Antitrust Division had
little reason to settle or fail to see its trial through. 74 By preserving
American Airlines as a stand-alone operation, the Antitrust Division
could preserve the same, if not greater, level of competition than had
previously existed.75 A settlement that did anything other than resolve
all of the Antitrust Division’s anti-competitive concerns was less than
the government needed to accept.76
B. THE ADVANTAGE-PRICING THEORY
The Antitrust Division’s advantage-pricing theory was that U.S.
Airways was a maverick in the airline industry because of its low
pricing. 77 U.S. Airways executed its pricing model through its
Advantage Fares program—a strategy that undercut legacy airlines’
nonstop service fares by offering less expensive connecting flights. 78
The Advantage Fares program offered a flight with one stop for forty
69. Complaint, supra note 25, at 26; Joe Brancatelli, How American Airlines Could
Bail Out of the US Airways Merger—and Why It Might Want To, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J.
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/news-wire/2013/09/04/
will-american-airlines-ditch-usairways.html?page=all.
70. Complaint, supra note 25, at 9.
71. See Brancatelli, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.; see Complaint, supra note 25, at 26.
75. See Brancatelli, supra note 69.
76. See Complaint, supra note 25, at 32-33.
77. Complaint, supra note 25, at 4-5.
78. Id.
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percent less than a nonstop flight run by a legacy airline. 79
Unfortunately, a merger would make the new company less likely to
keep prices low because even though it would retain U.S. Airways’
management, it would now see itself as a “big boy” player in the
industry that did not need revenue from Advantage Fares’ passengers.80
U.S. Airways was valuable to consumers because it declined to
conform to the industry practice of not undercutting the nonstop prices
offered by legacy competitors.81 Because of U.S. Airways’ Advantage
Fares program, legacy airlines like American, Delta, and United were
often driven to offer less expensive fares for connecting service.82 The
Antitrust Division’s complaint suggested that “Advantage Fares will go
the way of free baggage check once the merger is complete.”83
The Antitrust Division supported its theory of harm to consumers
by showing that U.S. Airways had admitted, as far back as September
2010, that its Advantage Fares program would change if it had a
different, perhaps larger, route network.84 The complaint further stated
that “[i]nternal analysis at American in October 2012 concluded that
‘[t]he [Advantage Fares] program would have to be eliminated in a
merger with American, as American’s large non-stop markets would
now be susceptible to reactionary pricing from Delta and United.’”85
Meanwhile, the Antitrust Division attempted to pin U.S. Airways
against the wall by highlighting skepticism that the U.S. Airways’ CEO
had expressed about other airlines’ commitment to promises made
during antitrust review when they previously sought merger approval.86
U.S. Airways’ CEO Doug Parker had stated, “I’m hopeful they’re just
saying what they need . . . to get this [transaction] approved.” 87 The
complaint then asserted that U.S. Airways and American Airlines were

79. Steven Pearlstein, The U.S. Airways–American Airlines Merger is a Go. Here’s
Why It Maybe Shouldn’t Be, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/12/the-u-s-airwaysamerican-airlines-merger-is-a-go-heres-why-it-maybe-shouldnt-be/ [hereinafter Merger
is a Go].
80. Complaint, supra note 25, at 4-5.
81. Merger is a Go, supra note 79.
82. Complaint, supra note 25, at 4-5.
83. Merger is a Go, supra note 79.
84. Complaint, supra note 25, at 21.
85. Id. at 22.
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id.
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doing the same thing: “saying what they believe needs to be said to pass
antitrust scrutiny.”88
An example of Doug Parker’s saying whatever was necessary to get
merger approval was widely disseminated in the press.89 Accordingly,
the Wall Street Journal reported that Parker, the longest-sitting CEO of a
U.S.-based airline, had a team that was particularly experienced in
merger integration.90 The article quoted Parker as saying, “We’ve seen
what other airlines did . . . . But it’s really difficult work. We’re doing
everything we can to do it as well as possible and not cause disruption to
our customers.”91 Parker’s language hedged expectations that the merger
would not affect services and prices, and it attempted to allay the
antitrust concerns of the Antitrust Department.92
III. THERE ARE THREE POTENTIAL REASONS THE ANTITRUST DIVISION
HAD TO SETTLE THIS LAWSUIT, BUT ONLY THE POLITICAL MOTIVATION
IS PERSUASIVE.
A. OPTION 1: A SETTLEMENT WAS THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S STRATEGY
ALL ALONG.
It is possible that the Antitrust Division had long planned to settle.93
Perhaps the harsh language in its complaint against the airlines and the
public statements of William Baer, Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, were mere puffery in support of an attempt to
intimidate the parties into settling.94 This is unlikely, however, because
the Antitrust Division had serious misgivings with the merger due to its
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Biggest Challenges, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Jad Mouwad & Christopher Drew, U.S. in Talks to Settle Suit Over American–
US Airways Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
05/business/us-in-talks-to-settle-suit-over-american-us-airways-merger.html (where the
article stated that Eric Holder said “the department hoped for a settlement, but remained
‘fully prepared to take this case to trial’”).
94. See Complaint, supra note 25; see Terry Maxon, Justice Official: Here’s Why
We’re Fighting the US Airways–American Airlines Merger, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013), http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2013/08/justice-officialheres-why-were-fighting-the-us-airways-american-airlines-merger.html/
[hereinafter
Fighting the Merger].
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stand-alone and advantage-pricing issues. 95 These concerns were not
mere puffery—they were substantive anti-competitive hazards that the
Antitrust Division believed would become a reality if the merger went
forward.96
In previous lawsuits against proposed mergers, the language in the
Antitrust Division’s complaint was indicative of whether it was willing
to settle.97 Comparing the Anheuser-Busch– Grupo Modelo and AT&T–
T-Mobile mergers to the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger can
illustrate this intention.98
In its suit to block the merger of Anheuser-Busch InBev with
Grupo Modelo, the Antitrust Division’s complaint suggested that the
parties would probably be able to reach a settlement. 99 While the
complaint noted a high-low price gap between Anheuser-Busch and
Modelo similar to the American Airlines and U.S. Airways difference in
pricing models, 100 the language the complaint used in the AnheuserBusch–Grupo Modelo complaint suggested a settlement was possible
through a less forceful tone, 101 unlike the language indicators in the
American Airlines–U.S. Airways complaint.
The Antitrust Division’s complaint in the Anheuser-Busch–Grupo
Modelo merger contained weak language regarding remedies. 102 The
complaint stated that the parties’ suggested remedy was merely
“inadequate,” but it did not elaborate with stronger language.103 It stated
that the suggested remedy (selling Grupo Modelo’s interest in Crown
Imports to another company and entering into supply agreements giving
95.
96.

Complaint, supra note 25, at 9, 21.
Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc.,
No. 1:13-cv-01236 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013).
97. See Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Challenging Anheuser-Busch
InBev’s Proposed Acquisition of Grupo Modelo, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan.
31, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/292096.htm.
98. See id.
99. Id. (where Baer said, “The companies’ attempt to fix this anticompetitive deal
through the sale of Modelo’s existing interest in Crown and a temporary supply
agreement is not sufficient to prevent consumer harm from ABI’s acquisition of its
competitor, Modelo,” leaving open the opportunity for a “fix” that would be sufficient).
100. Id.; Complaint, supra note 25, at 4-5.
101. Complaint at 20-21, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, No. 1:13cv-00127 (D.D.C. Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f292100/292100.pdf.
102. See id.
103. Id.
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that company the right to import Grupo Modelo beer into the United
States) “provides no guaranteed protection for consumers that any of its
terms will be followed if [Anheuser-Busch] is able to secure antitrust
approval for this acquisition.”104 This suggested that if a guarantee could
be provided, the potential that Anheuser-Busch would be “able to secure
antitrust approval” was a distinct possibility.105
Even analysts expected Anheuser-Busch and the Antitrust Division
“to reach an accord on reasonable terms.”106 This was in part because
Anheuser-Busch believed obtaining the rights to Corona and some other
Grupo Modelo brands through the merger was less significant for the
company’s growth than maintaining control of Grupo Modelo’s
operations in other localities.107
Gina Talamona, a spokeswoman for the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), was quoted in a newspaper article saying, “As we have said all
along, any settlement would have to fully protect U.S. consumers by
preserving the competition that Grupo Modelo currently provides, while
giving a divestiture buyer the freedom and capability to compete
vigorously going forward.” 108 Her language indicated the DOJ’s
openness to settling its suit from the very beginning.109
The resulting settlement allowed Anheuser-Busch to move forward
with a $20.1 billion acquisition of Grupo Modelo. 110 The Antitrust
Division was still able to draw some concessions, including Grupo
Modelo’s sale of its fifty percent stake in Crown Imports—the company
responsible for distributing Corona and some Grupo Modelo brands in
the United States.111
By contrast, the Antitrust Division stated that its concerns with the
AT&T–T-Mobile merger could not be resolved, and it was quite

104.
105.
106.

Id. at 24.
See id.
Michael J. de la Merced, Anheuser-Busch Merger Deal Clears an Antitrust
Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/20-billionbeer-deal-reaches-agreement-to-clear-antitrust-hurdle/.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Edward Wyatt, Antitrust Agreement in Merger of Brewers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
19, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/anheuser-busch-reaches-deal-withantitrust-regulators/.
111. Id.
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committed to its position. 112 The language in the AT&T–T-Mobile
complaint was similar to the language used in the American Airlines–
U.S. Airways complaint and public statements from the Antitrust
Division.113 Sharis Pozen, the acting head of the Antitrust Division at the
time said, “Any way you look at this merger, it is anticompetitive . . . . It
raised serious concerns, and we believe it violates the law.”114
The Antitrust Division in its AT&T–T-Mobile complaint stated that
it was concerned with the high consolidation of the mobile wireless
telecommunications services business 115 and the nearly inevitable
increase in AT&T’s market power following the merger, particularly in
major metropolitan areas such as Dallas, Houston, Oklahoma City,
Birmingham, Honolulu, and Seattle.116 The first anticompetitive effect
the complaint addressed was the possibility that the merger would stifle
innovation.117 The complaint stated that this anticompetitive effect was a
possibility because, much like U.S. Airways, T-Mobile was a “faster,
more agile, and scrappy” competitor who would “find innovative ways
to overcome scale disadvantages.” 118 The nature of the market also
increased the chances that this merger would only lead to a more
consolidated market because of the industry’s “transparent pricing, little
buyer-side market power, and high barriers to entry and expansion.”119
According to the Antitrust Division, allowing the merger to be
consummated would result in higher prices and decreased “quality and
quantity of services.”120
Industry commentators resoundingly opined that the strong stance
of the Antitrust Division indicated that a settlement was unlikely. 121
112. See David Goldman, DOJ Files Antitrust Suit to Block AT&T Merger with TMobile, CNN (Aug. 31, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/31/technology/
att_tmobile_antitrust/.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Complaint at 11-12, United States of America v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
Justice-ATT-TMobile-Complaint.pdf.
116. Id. at 2-3, Appendix B iii.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. at 21.
121. Gov’t Blocks AT&T Bid for T-Mobile, supra note 60, at 1; James B. Stewart,
Antitrust Suit Is Simple Calculus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/10/business/att-and-t-mobile-merger-is-a-textbook-case.html?pagewanted=all;
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Thus, Richard Dineen, an HSBC analyst, speculated that “[t]he DOJ’s
concerns imply that they don’t want less than four big national players.
There had been speculation that Sprint and T-Mobile may get together,
but it looks on this basis that even that would be objectionable.” 122
Similarly, the New York Times published that “confidence on AT&T’s
part seems inexplicable ... For if ever there was a merger likely to be
blocked on antitrust grounds, this is it.” 123 It quoted Herbert
Hovenkamp, a professor of law at the University of Iowa and a leader in
American antitrust law, as saying, “It’s only a slight overstatement to
say that if they weren’t going to block this one, the Justice Department
might as well just throw the antitrust guidelines out the window ... This
merger clearly seems to violate them.”124
Bert Foer opined in an interview that the Antitrust Division had
“clearly drawn a line in the sand” against a settlement with AT&T and
T-Mobile.125 At the time, Foer was the head of the American Antitrust
Institute in Washington, which opposed the deal.126
In the American–U.S. Airlines case, Bill Baer said that the two
airlines were “viable, healthy and in a position to be competitively
aggressive and successful on a standalone basis.” He also refused to
concede much ground, stating that “while shareholders might benefit,
[and] creditors might benefit from consolidation, the fact of the matter is
that consumers [would] get the shaft.” 127 The strong wording of his
statements suggested that the suit should have followed a pathway more
akin to that of the AT&T–T-Mobile merger. 128 However, it ended up
adopting a settlement more similar to that of Anheuser-Busch–Grupo
Modelo merger.129
Tom Schoenberg, Sara Forden & Jeff Bliss, T-Mobile Antitrust Challenge Leaves
AT&T With Little Recourse on Takeover, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-31/u-s-files-antitrust-complaint-to-blockproposed-at-t-t-mobile-merger.html.
122. Gov’t Blocks AT&T Bid for T-Mobile, supra note 60, at 2.
123. Stewart, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. Schoenberg, Forden & Bliss, supra note 121.
126. Id.
127. Fighting the Merger, supra note 94.
128. See id.
129. See Jennifer Koons, Airlines Settlement: A ‘Retreat’ or Victory for the Justice
Department?, MAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS, POLICY AND THE LAW (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://www.mainjustice.com/2013/11/12/airlines-settlement-a-retreat-or-victory-for-thejustice-department/.
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While he vowed that the Antitrust Division would evaluate “each
merger on its own merit,” the Antitrust Division’s analysis of the U.S.
Airways and American Airlines merger and antitrust history showed that
in the Antitrust Division’s “view, looking at the evidence before [it], is
that the right outcome here (is) a full-stop injunction.”130
However, three months later, Baer changed his tone and boasted
that the Antitrust Division believed its case had gotten stronger as the
parties neared trial, and that the Antitrust Division surmised that the
merging parties knew this fact.131 Baer cited the “high bar” American
Airlines and U.S. Airlines had to jump over as one of reasons the parties
settled, 132 suggesting it was because the airlines feared losing. 133 He
denied that politics played a role in the settlement, calling it a “good
substantive, pro-competitive result.” 134 Therefore, while the Antitrust
Division may have said the settlement was good for the economy, its
180-degree turnabout from Baer’s hard line seems inexplicable and
unlikely to be part of the Antitrust Division’s long-term strategy.135
B. OPTION 2: ANOTHER POTENTIAL EXPLANATION FOR PARTIES’
SETTLEMENT IS THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S FEAR OF FULLY PURSUING THE
SUIT.
By necessity, agencies at times act with consideration to their
probability of success in particular antitrust cases because a suit’s
success or failure may affect the agency’s own size and power.136 This
means that government agencies may consider political implications
when deciding which cases to pursue since successfully prosecuted
high-profile cases garner greater rewards for the agency and the
individual lawyers’ careers.137 It also matters which cases the agencies
decline to pursue because a loss may affect the agency’s budget
allocation and staffing quality.138

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Fighting the Merger, supra note 94.
Koons, supra note 129.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.; see Fighting the Merger, supra note 94.
Sokol, supra note 22, at 1073-74.
Id.
Id.
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However, the chances the Antitrust Division had for success in this
case at trial were strong.139 Even though numerous experts and lawyers
were quoted in the media as saying that the merger was likely to go
through in spite of the Antitrust Division’s suit,140 many antitrust experts
also published articles that the government had a strong case and would
win.141
Despite the divide between experts’ predictions on the case’s
outcome, in deciding to settle, Baer was not motivated by a fear of
losing the case because he was confident in the merits of his position
and had strong convictions that an injunction was the only viable
solution.142 His language in the complaint was forceful, stating, “This
merger positions US Airways’ management to continue the trend (of
consolidation)—at the expense of consumers.”143

139. Bill Baer, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Assistant Attorney General Bill
Baer at the Conference Call Regarding the Justice Department’s Proposed Settlement
with U.S. Airways and American Airlines (Nov. 12, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/301626.htm)
[hereinafter
Conference Call Remarks] (where Baer himself even after announcing the merger
strongly said, “I can assure you that we were confident in the evidence we would have
presented at trial.”).
140. Terry Maxon, How Will the American Airlines–US Airways Lawsuit Turn Out?
Depends on Whom You Ask, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20131028-how-will-the-americanairlines-us-airways-lawsuit-turn-out-depends-on-whom-you-ask.ece [hereinafter How
Will the Lawsuit Turn Out?] (Aviation consultant Scott Hamilton of Leeham Co. LLC
said “I’d like to think this will be settled before it goes to trial, though this might be
wishful thinking. Pressure is building on DOJ (and presumably the White House) to
drop this. Unions, a Democratic constituency, are for the merger. American and US
Airways want this off the table. I think DOJ may look for a face-saving way out and
call it a day. I hope,” adding that there would likely be slot divestitures at Washington
Reagan National and New York LaGuardia Airports. Airline analyst Hunter Keay of
Wolfe Research said “We assume the chances for a settlement before the trial starts are
very remote... We say there’s about a 1 in 4 chance that there’s a settlement after the
trial begins.”).
141. Id. (where Jonathan Lewis, antitrust lawyer with Baker Hostetler in
Washington D.C., said “The airlines’ own documents (many of which are cited in the
complaint) are damning. It will be difficult for the airline executives to walk away from
what they have said in those documents.”).
142. See Fighting the Merger, supra note 94.
143. Complaint, supra note 25, at, 4.
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The only voices that seemed to believe a settlement was likely
came from outside the Antitrust Division.144 After the Antitrust Division
filed its complaint, Reuters reported a U.S. Airways spokesman as
saying, “The concessions we were willing to offer were designed to
address competitive concerns that DOJ had raised during the
investigation. We continue to believe there ought to be a realistic
possibility of settlement.”145
Another voice for settlement came from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Sean Lane, who implied he might approve the bankruptcy plan of AMR,
American Airlines’ parent company, in spite of the Antitrust Division’s
lawsuit against the cornerstone of the bankruptcy plan: the merger.146
Baer alleged the Antitrust Division filed the lawsuit because it had
determined the merger would affect just what § 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits by substantially reducing competition in the domestic
commercial air-travel industry. 147 Baer cited the non-necessity of the
merger for both parties, how the competition between the two airlines
was essential in keeping prices low for consumers, and the nature of the
already heavily consolidated airline industry.148 Baer strongly urged that
the Antitrust Division “simply cannot approve a merger that would
result in U.S. consumers’ paying higher fares, higher fees and receiving
less service.”149 He did not mention the possibility of a settlement, but
instead called the lawsuit “the best possible chance for continued
competition in an important industry that [consumers] have come to rely
upon.”150

144. David Ingram & Diane Bartz, Countdown begins to U.S. airline merger trial in
November, REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/08/30/us-american-usairways-trial-idUSBRE97T0IJ20130830.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Conference Call Remarks, supra note 139.
148. Id.
149. Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer at
the Conference Call Regarding the Justice Department’s Lawsuit Challenging Us
Airways’ Proposed Merger with American Airlines (August 13, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-assistantattorney-general-bill-baer-conference-call-regarding).
150. Id.
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C. OPTION 3: RATHER THAN A LONG-TERM STRATEGY OR A FEEBLE FEAR
OF LITIGATION FAILURE, POLITICAL FORCES MAY HAVE MORE LIKELY THAN
NOT BEEN THE DRIVER BEHIND THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS LAWSUIT.
It may be considered naive to believe antitrust is normally free
from political considerations; 151 however, this is not naïve—it is
correct.152 Nevertheless, the combination of the lobbying efforts by the
parties, the Antitrust Division’s admissions in its competitive impact
statement following the settlement, and Attorney General Eric Holder’s
statements apart from the Justice Department suggest politics did play a
role in the agreement the parties reached in the American Airlines–U.S.
Airways case.153 Therefore, the merger appears to be an exception to the
norm of non-partisan antitrust enforcement.154
1. Lobbying is quite commonplace throughout much of the government’s
decision-making,155 but what is significant in this settlement is who
lobbied and with whom the lobbying had traction.
Lobbying groups are powerful forces in affecting government
decisions.156 Interest groups save informational costs when they develop
and advocate for their policy issues because of their economies of
scale.157 They are also better at mobilizing the public behind legislation
for which they advocate.158
151.
152.

Sokol, supra note 22, at 1073.
See id. at 1072 (where agency antitrust enforcement develops slowly and based
upon institutional needs, not rapid political or partisan shifts).
153. Jad Mouawad, A Tricky Airline Merger, but With Labor’s Blessing, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/business/a-tricky-airline-mergerbut-with-labors-blessing.html [hereinafter Labor’s Blessing]; Competitive Impact
Statement, supra note 96 at 8; Ben Mutzabaugh, Holder on AA Suit: “We Hope to
Resolve This Short of a Trial,” USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/todayinthesky/2013/11/04/report-feds-want-broad-divestitures-from-aa-usairways/3433157/.
154. See Labor’s Blessing, supra note 153; Competitive Impact Statement, supra
note 96, at 8; see Mutzabaugh, supra note 153.
155. See Brad Plumer, The Outsized Returns From Lobbying, WASHINGTON POST
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-outsizedreturns-from-lobbying/2011/10/10/gIQADSNEaL_blog.html; see Lobbying Database,
OPEN SECRETS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/.
156. Sokol, supra note 22, at 1091-92.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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In the case of the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger, labor
unions were unusually and strongly in favor of the merger.159 “The two
main bogeys that an airline needs to worry about during any merger
integration are labor and technology,” said Hunter Keay, an analyst with
Wolfe Research.160,161 Oftentimes, gaining the support of labor unions is
difficult in spite of the strong sense of trust between management and
union leadership.162
In the United–Continental Airlines merger, the labor unions did not
support the merger. 163 The Antitrust Division’s case itself against the
United–Continental merger was somewhat of a surprise because the
Antitrust Division had not previously voiced major concerns when other
airlines merged with one another.164 For instance, the Antitrust Division
did not protest when U.S. Airways and America West Airlines merged
in 2005, nor did the Antitrust Division speak up in Delta’s 2008
purchase of Northwest Airlines or the 2011 Southwest Airlines purchase
of AirTran Airways.165
Eventually, the key issues with the labor unions came to light,
showing the public that they did not support the United–Continental
merger. 166 Pilots were worried about furloughs and seniority, while

159.
160.

Labor’s Blessing, supra note 153.
Wolfe Research is a research boutique that specializes in a number of industry
sectors,
including
the
airline
industry.
About,
WOLFE
RESEARCH,
http://wolferesearch.com/about/the-wolfe-edge/.
161. Labor’s Blessing, supra note 153.
162. Id.
163. Brett Snyder, Bad News: United, Continental Merger Already Seeing Pilot
Unrest, MONEY WATCH, CBS NEWS, (July 8, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/bad-news-united-continental-merger-already-seeing-pilot-unrest/ (where Capt.
Wendy Morse, chief representative for the United pilots, said, “As I’ve consistently
said, there is a right path and a wrong path. This merger could be simple if the right
path is chosen. Regrettably it appears the companies at this early juncture are headed
down the wrong path. Obviously, allowing talks to stall over non-economic issues
shows that management is once again choosing the wrong path.”).
164. U.S. Moves to Block Merger, supra note 6.
165. Id.
166. See Jenalia Moreno, With Airlines Merged, Unions Must Try to Fly United,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.chron.com/business/article/Withairlines-merged-unions-must-try-to-fly-1617354.php (where the labor unions for each
group, including pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, ramp workers and cargo
employees, operated on such different pay scales and operations methods that a dispute
over new collective bargaining agreements was expected to result from the merger).
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flight attendants were concerned with contract negotiations.167 Even into
2013, three years after the 2010 merger of United and Continental,
employees were still struggling to ratify labor contracts.168
The unions in the case of American Airlines and U.S. Airways said
they foresaw better benefits from the merged corporation.169 Unions for
American Airlines’ three largest sets of employees—its pilots, flight
attendants, and ground workers—publicly and in court supported the
merger.170 Based on the agreed terms, the unions would receive roughly
a quarter of what American Airlines’ creditors would receive in the case
that the merger went through in the form of shares of the newly merged
corporation.171
Another sign that politics played a key role in the American
Airlines–U.S. Airways settlement is the sort of congressional support
the American Airlines and U.S. Airways merger received.172 In addition
to the airline industry’s typical lobby funding from Republican
candidates,173 the merger also had support from sixty-five Democratic
167. Jenalia Moreno, Labor Issues Key to Continental-United Merger Success,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 1, 2010), http://www.chron.com/business/article/Laborissues-key-to-Continental-United-merger-1694557.php.
168. Jack Nicas, United Continental Employees Ratify New Labor Contracts, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230465
5104579165580531518844.
169. Mike Spector & Susan Carey, American Airlines Unions Support US Airways
Merger, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303425504577354493373319140 [hereinafter Unions Support
Merger]; Sky Talk: Unions Reaction to Closing of American, US Airways Merger, STAR
TELEGRAM (Dec. 10, 2013), http://blogs.star-telegram.com/sky_talk/2013/12/unionsreaction-to-closing-of-american-us-airways-merger.html (where pilots unions said they
foresaw “mutually beneficial results” from a joint collective bargaining agreement;
where flight attendants foresaw the benefits of “receiving their allocation of the new
American’s equity”; where machinists declined to participate in celebrating the new
merger because they were allegedly refused a fair contract and because they believed
the merger would not allow the companies to realize the synergies that had been
promoted).
170. Labor’s Blessing, supra note 153
171. Id.
172. See Ely Portillo, Democratic members of Congress urge Obama, DOJ to allow
US
Airways
merger,
CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(Oct.
16,
2013),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/10/16/4392651/democratic-congressmen-urgeobama.html#.Ut7Ke_30Du0.
173. Airlines, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind
=T1100.
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Congressmen and Congresswomen.174 This was unusual, given that probusiness, Republican-affiliated politicians, and not Democrats, usually
support non-intervention in business-merger decisions.175
The letter of Democratic support for the merger was an open
showing of pressure from Congress on the executive branch to allow the
merger to proceed.176 The letter, addressed to President Barack Obama,
stated:
We believe DOJ’s legal challenge puts at risk the future economic
security of our constituents, tens-of-thousands of unionized workers
at both airlines, and the economic well-being of communities that we
represent… We are concerned that the DOJ’s lawsuit creates an
atmosphere of uncertainty for our respective congressional districts
and constituents. While we share your concern regarding any
potential impact on consumers as consolidation in any industry is
contemplated, we believe that DOJ’s concerns as outlined in the
complaint filed last month are not an adequate representation of all
177
of the facts.

This unique combination of union and Democratic Congressional
support made it highly probable that politics played at least some role in
the decision to allow the merger to move forward in a settlement.178
2. The competitive impact statement stated that the settlement failed to
resolve the Antitrust Division’s concerns with the stand-alone and
advantage pricing theories, making the settlement highly unusual.
While the settlement would go on to please the labor unions,
AMR’s creditors, and the management of both American Airlines and
U.S. Airways, the Antitrust Division’s Competitive Impact Statement of
the settlement stated that it does “not create a new independent
competitor, nor does it purport to replicate American’s capacity

174.
175.

Portillo, supra note 172.
See Letter from Representative Michael C. Burgess, M.D. to U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder (Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://burgess.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=347480.
176. Portillo, supra note 172.
177. Letter from Democratic Representatives to Obama Administration in support of
merger (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://veasey.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/reps-veasey-pastor-and-colleagues-call-on-obama-administration-to-settle.
178. Portillo, supra note 172; Unions Support Merger, supra note 169.

2014]

POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN AIRLINES–U.S.
AIRWAYS MERGER AND ANTITRUST SETTLEMENT

199

expansion plans or create Advantage Fares where they might otherwise
be eliminated.”179
Instead, the merger leaves a heavily consolidated airline industry
with only three legacy carriers with large domestic and international
flight networks that can offer well-known brands and frequent-flyer
programs.180 Smaller networks will still exist, which can offer lower-fare
options,181 but the newly merged airline would be considered by antitrust
regulators and consumers to be one of the three legacy airlines.182 This
merger eliminated one of consumer’s low-cost options, a role which
U.S. Airways had played forcefully through its Advantage Fares
program.183
The merger settlement attempts to address the feared harms from an
amplified presence at some airports and wider anticompetitive harms by
requiring “the divestiture of an unprecedented quantity of valuable
facilities at seven of the most important airports in the United States.”184
The Competitive Impact Statement also discusses alternatives to the
settlement, which included a trial on the merits against American
Airlines and U.S. Airways. 185 The Antitrust Division’s Competitive
Impact Statement predicted the settlement would save the government
time, money, and the uncertainty of trial,186 but did not elaborate on the
alleged uncertainty or give a quantitative measure for how unsure it was
of success at trial, had it gone forward.187
3. Attorney General Eric Holder made a statement that was out of step
and not in conjunction with the Antitrust Division, stating that the suit
could likely be settled depending on what concessions were reached.
On November 4, 2013, while U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
conferred with the press regarding another issue, he made a detour in his
statements to address the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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suit. 188 He said the discussions were “ongoing,” and that the DOJ
“hope[s] to be able to resolve this short of trial.”189
When the press asked him if the government wanted to ensure that
a potential settlement would be required to include a divestiture of slots
at major airports like Ronald Reagan National, Holder agreed and said
the focus was “to make sure that any resolution in this case necessarily
included divestitures of facilities at key constrained airports throughout
the United States. That, for us, is something that has to be a part of—of
any resolution.”190
This language differs from the previous statements of Baer on
behalf of the Antitrust Division, 191 and suggests that something else
(perhaps political concerns) influenced the DOJ and what actually
resulted: a settlement that avoided trial, did not solve any of the
Antitrust Division’s key concerns with the merger’s anticompetitive
effects, and only included minor divestitures of slots at particular
airports of concern.192
CONCLUSION
Oftentimes, interest groups like airline lobbyists are seen as selfish
because they seek their own economic interests at the expense of the
constituents that legislators are elected to represent. 193 Similarly, a
skeptical public perceives legislators as serving their own re-election
and personal motivations.194 Interest groups and legislators can rebrand
their efforts as “progress,” but regardless of the characterization, in
some unique instances it appears that politics can influence antitrust law
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enforcement to the detriment of average consumers.195 In the case of the
American Airlines and U.S. Airways merger, it seems that many other
factors could have explained the settlement. 196 President Barack
Obama’s administration vowed in 2009 to return to more aggressive
enforcement of antitrust laws after the Bush administration treated
defendant corporations far too leniently.197 The Obama administration’s
toughened antitrust enforcement 198 makes the possibility that politics
influenced the decision to settle this particular antitrust merger suit—as
opposed to taking it to trial—seem all the more likely.

195. See Andrew I. Gavil, Competition and Cooperation on Sherman Island: An
Antitrust Ethnography, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225, 1230-31 (1995).
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2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/economy/12antitrust.html?page
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